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Countering “Made in China 2025”: Strategy 
for Western Powers in a Cybered World1  
David Mussington2 
 
Abstract: Cyber capabilities have diffused disruptive potential to new actors and locations around 
the world. The engine for diffusion, however, is the economy, not politics. Interactions in trade, 
global product development systems and digital services spreads patterns of mutual dependence – 
and vulnerability – worldwide. Access to this global economy equates to participation in wealth 
creation and technological progress. Denial of access creates disadvantages and imposes costs. For 
nation-states, this environment is full of both risk and opportunity. Confronting a Chinese 
government strategy that targets Western economic advantages, the democracies face a series of 
questions: what is the best strategy for successful protection of assets and infrastructures of value? 
What should be done about authoritarian states that both participate in the cybered world, yet 
oppose the open, transparent and democratic norms of cyberspace’s originators? 
 
  
                                                 
1 Please cite as: Mussington, David, “Countering ‘Made in China 2025’: Strategy for Western Powers in a Cybered 
World,” in Demchak, Chris C. and Benjamin Schechter, eds. Military Cyber Affairs: Systemic Cyber Defense 3, no. 
2 (2018). 
2 Director of the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and Professor of the Practice in the School of Public 
Policy, University of Maryland, College Park 
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Introduction  
Cyber capabilities have diffused destructive and exploitation potential to new categories of 
actors. Beyond nation-states, cyber technologies empower whole categories of hacktivists, terrorist 
groups, and predictably – private sector businesses. Where these businesses operate critical 
infrastructures, their awareness of risk factors and operational capabilities can exceed that of 
national governments. A second feature of this environment is the assembly, disassembly and re-
combination of digital service providers, software companies and device fabricators – in a shifting 
ecosystem of old and new enterprise and company formations – as investors and entrepreneurs 
seek new market opportunities, launch new starts and dismantle failed businesses.  
National governments seek to manipulate and reshape this global environment to their own 
economic and security ends. Conflict in cyberspace – over jurisdiction, data confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and over conditions of access – expands as does problematic attribution over 
particular events and trends. Authoritarian states and a diminishing number of democracies 
contend for control and influence in the global system. What possible strategies and options exist 
for Western democracies to defend their current positions and perhaps regain lost momentum in 
shaping the cybered future? 
Legacy Presumptions  
It is commonly assumed that the success of authoritarian countries – most prominently 
China – but also countries such as Iran and North Korea – in generating cyber capabilities and 
successfully exfiltrating high value data and intellectual property (IP) - means that the freedom of 
action and advantages enjoyed by Western democratic nations are in eclipse. Russia is also of 
primary concern – though not for economic reasons. Further, the point is not simply that the 
democracies are going to be a diminishing minority among the world’s nation states, but that the 
future poses a new challenge – where economic growth and technological dynamism characteristic 
of western capitalist countries may now be superseded by alternate governance models deriving 
from Asia. In addition, states not typically thought of as challengers to Western countries have 
gained an ability to leverage IT advances to disrupt or exploit infrastructures and digital services 
– posing a cyber as well as physical threat. This reality, among all others, has begun to reduce the 
West’s confidence that it can compete effectively without a right-ward political turn — further 
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undermining the old certainties of national security and a predictable international setting led by 
liberal capitalist democracies. Finally, the innovative capacities of firms based in the industrialized 
West are said to be diminished through predatory technology and IP acquisition processes 
leveraged by the government of China. As the new proto-hegemon arises, all others must adapt or 
perish in the face of its strategic preferences. 3 
This is a frightening vision. But is it accurate? And what does this say about the strategies 
still available to Western states?  Is decline inevitable. This paper examines some aspects of this 
strategic dilemma, aiming to deconstruct some of the assumptions of this declinist frame of 
reference. It also seeks to define the space available for the democracies to save themselves and 
others whose world order preferences parallel their own. All may not be lost, but neither is change 
avoidable. 
How We Got Here 
Western capitalist democracies advocated for – and fostered – the emergence of the 
cybered world. That world provided seeds that now empower authoritarian competitors. After all, 
the rise of cyber power asymmetrically advantages (rising) weaker states – allowing them to 
leverage dominant states’ technical and economic models to launch growth-oriented competing 
strategies for themselves. This approach does not mimic western frameworks, it cherry-picks them 
in pursuit of mercantilist and exclusionary goals.  
The Western vision of this broader distribution of technology, wealth creation, and 
independence was (and remains) that positive and mutual gain is possible through free exchange. 
In trade, global markets for digital services, and a sophisticated division of labor aligning 
production factors in MNE (multinational enterprise) systems of asset and value transfer, “all boats 
are said to rise together”. A crucial enabler for this framework was the stability of great power 
politics reinforced variously by the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and global power dynamics 
favoring the dominance of the West.  Access to resources and markets was secured behind the 
                                                 
3 For an interesting analysis of Japan’s hedging strategies for a rising China, see Ll. López i Vidal & Àngels 
Pelegrín (2018) “Hedging Against China: Japanese Strategy Towards A Rising Power”, Asian Security, 14:2, 193-
211, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2017.1333983; for an older and less rigorous articulation of this idea, see Fareed Zakaria 
“A ‘Hedge’ Strategy toward China” Washington Post November 15 2010. (url: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/14/AR2010111403883.html) Accessed 25 September 2018. 
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defenses offered by US power. For much of the world this stability – even if viewed as problematic 
– became both familiar and a predictable backdrop for planning and investment.  
Overtime, however, as US and western technological and economic advantages over rising 
powers diminished, the composition of production inside Western economies also began to change 
– generating unemployment, maldistribution of wealth, and political forces in opposition to open 
trade and immigration. Our current era is characterized by these forces – and by the reemergence 
of class, race, and geostrategic divergences of view that erode expectations of safety and security 
in the West.  For China and other beneficiaries of the emerging technology and cyberspace 
landscape, however, optimism and future oriented visions of new status and opportunity abound. 
This thrust collides with recently resurgent Western suspicion and insecurities. For cyberspace, 
this means that a legacy of innovation and wealth creation may be producing a return to 
competition and concern with absolute – not relative –gains from trade. As the mercantilist 
strategies of China find success – and envy, Western nations may seek to close markets and 
production systems. Relative gains are either diminished – or not aligned with the established 
distribution of benefits to established constituencies within national borders. 
Today globalized technology development cycles and cybered production processes no 
longer deliver predictable gains to western economies in the way they do to China and other 
emerging powers (at least, that is the emerging perception). This has led to a reduction in support 
for liberal and open trade, and to the emergence of a constituency that favors unilateralism and 
“brute” reciprocity over the current rules-based system governing world trade.4 
The Requirement for Strategy in a Cybered Environment 
However, the discovery by Western countries that their advantages are no longer automatic 
need not mean inevitable decline. What it does signify is that the West needs to adopt explicit 
strategies for protection and catalytic investment – leaving behind “invisible hand” attitudes which 
                                                 
4 Current trade disputes involving the United States and its principal allies (e.g., the European Union and Canada) 
exemplify this emerging trend.  See Yasmeen Serhan “US Allies are helping Trump Undermine Global Trade”, The 
Atlantic (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/europe-mexico-canada-trump/562382/) 
Accessed 25 September 2018. 
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inhibit timely response to evidence of predatory behavior. Evidence of a geostrategic challenge by 
an emerging peer competitor requires a response at the scale of the risks presented.  
Concerns with a downturn in the positive returns to technology investments and market 
participation need to be addressed by identifying their root causes. This does not mean that Western 
countries should turn a blind eye to violations of accepted trading system rules including 
intellectual property rights protections. It does mean that flexibility needs to be found through a 
strategic redefinition of the rules to protect those areas deemed to be central to active and beneficial 
participation in a cybered global economy. In other words, picking winners may be necessary – 
with all of the risk, misaligned incentives, and potential for corruption such a path engenders. The 
only question is, in what areas should we focus our attention.  
Our rising competitors provide us ready guidance to the elements of the cybered world that 
may hold the key to shaping the global economic system in a Western friendly direction.  National 
strategies that leverage participation in technology research to “seed” the formation of business 
firms and wealth creation are clearly ascendant. China has adopted this approach, setting stretch 
goals for progress (if not global dominance) in key technology areas seen as vital to preserving 
growth opportunities for domestic firms. That country’s analysis may be flawed, but their pursuit 
of advantage through a deliberate and structured planning process is nonetheless validated by their 
recent success. China is not to be blamed for the refusal of others to take steps to recognize shifting 
conditions and areas where they can be disadvantaged. Rather than mimicking China’s strategy, 
we need to take note of their actions, evaluate the impact of a relative (or absolute) loss of US and 
Western capacity in key technologies, and conduct a horizon scan on the risks of different states 
of the world where China’s stretch goals are achieved (largely at our expense). Once identified, 
these cases can be ranked, analyzed and selectively countered using cyber and cross-domain 
capabilities. (See the schematic of this sort of ordered approach in Figure 1 below).  
Any counter-measures would of necessity need to be well coordinated, and multilateral. A 
point to be noted is that, whichever strategy we choose, investments in science, technology and 
STEM education will empower populations to participate in an economy where income levels for 
the more educated are rising relative to those in less skilled or de-skilled occupations. We can help 
ourselves through a rediscovery of the technical and educational excellence that we more recently 
have taken for granted. 
5
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Figure 1. Process Model for Policy Response and Countermeasures 
China’s Goals and Strategic Approach 
The “Made in China 2025” program identifies a list of technologies and industries where 
China seeks not only a competitive position, but outright dominance. Targeted areas include5: 
1) advanced information technology;  
2) robotics and automated machine tools;  
3) aircraft and aircraft components;  
4) maritime vessels and marine engineering equipment;  
5) advanced rail equipment;  
6) new energy vehicles;  
7) electrical generation and transmission equipment;  
8) agricultural machinery and equipment;  
9) new materials; and  
10) pharmaceuticals and advanced medical devices.  
                                                 
5 Office of the United States Trade Representative, findings of the investigation into china’s acts, policies, and 
practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation under section 301 of the trade act of 
1974 (Washington DC: Executive Office of the President, March 22, 2018), p. 19.    
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For this analysis, two market impacts are important: first, is the impact of China’s internal 
market on the setting of global technology standards; second is the explicit import substitution 
strategy adopted by China that violates WTO rules and disadvantages established industries in 
Western countries, potentially costing them both global market share and employment.6  
China uses a number of mechanisms and policy tools to achieve its objectives. These 
include mandatory joint venture partnerships for foreign firms seeking to do business in China in 
designated industries;7 loans at less than market rates to domestic manufacturers that create excess 
capacity (used for “dumping” product on international markets at lower than the cost of 
production)8, regulatory barriers to foreign participation in leading infrastructure projects and 
government procurements; de facto designation of “national champions” in key technology areas 
– with supporting programs of investment, protection from foreign competitors, and subsidization 
of R&D activities.9 An aligned foreign data and IP exfiltration campaign that supports the creation 
of new industrial competitors, and a myriad of parallel measures rounds out China’s aggressive 
data and technology acquisition efforts.10 
Needless to say, this activity also contributes to China’s defense industrial capabilities, 
consistent with the military industrial complex approach adopted by that country – leveraging 
                                                 
6 For a survey of key impacts, see the US-China 2017 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, 115th Congress, November 2017. Chapter 4. “China’s High Tech Development,” pp. 507-537. 
(https://www.uscc.gov). Accessed 28 April 2017; and Jessica Myers, “How ‘Made in China 2025’ became the real 
threat in a trade war.” Los Angeles Times 24 April 2018 [Briefing], http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-
2025-20180424-story.html; and, Scott Kennedy, “Made in China 2025,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-
2025. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
7 For an example of the arc of such a partnership, see Nicole Perlroth and John Markoff, “Symantec Dissolves a 
Chinese Alliance.” New York Times 26 March 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/technology/symantec-
dissolves-alliance-with -huawei-of-china.html. Accessed 28 April 2018. The authors note Symantec’s fear that 
continuing the joint venture would limit its access to classified US information.  Also, see China Briefing: Challenges 
Facing German Investors 23 April 2018, https://www.china-briefing.com/2018/04/23/china-germany-relations-
opportunities-emerge-investment-ties-grow-html. Commentators observe shifting regulatory schemas and threats to 
German intellectual property as berries to further investment. 
8 See Megan Geuss, “Chinese Solar Exports Fall in 2016 with global Anti-Dumping Measures,” Ars Technica 27 
February 2017, https://arstechnica.com/ 2017/02/Chinese-solar-exports-fall-in-2016-with-global-anti-dumping-
measures/; and Matthew Wald, “US Imposes Duties on Chinese Wind Tower Makers,” NY Times, 30 May 2012 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/business/energy-environment/US-imposes-duties-on-chinese-wind-
towers.html. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
9 See Harold Furchtgott-Roth, “Chinese Government Helps Huawei with 5G.” 
https://www.forbes.com/haroldfurchtgottroth/2017/05/08/chinese-government-helps-huawei-with-5G/; and “EU 
Commissioner Attacks China’s Telecom Subsidies” 27 March 2014 Financial Times 
https://www.ft.com/content/d6d0bec-b5cb-11e3-b40e-00144feabdc0 Accessed 28 February 2018 
10 Sam Frizell, “Here’s What Chinese Hackers Actually Stole from U.S. Companies,” Time 20 May 2014 
https://time.com/106319/heres-what-chinese-hackers-actually-stole-from -u.s.-companies/. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
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civilian technology progress to jump-start secular improvements in weapon systems and platforms 
sophistication. 
Countries affected by China’s industrial policy approach are indicated on the graphic 
provided by the Mercator Institute for China Policy below.11 Supply chain impacts are likely even 
more widespread. This is an example of a national government deciding to dramatically restructure 
a global cybered economic ecosystem – to its own ends. It is no surprise that other actors – 
perceiving a potentially negative impact on their own situations – will likely respond. The net 
effect of these iterative challenge and response cycles may not reflect the intentions of either 
initiating or responding actors. Indeed, identifying which is which is itself controversial.
 
                                                 
11 Jost Wubbeke, Miriam Meissner, Max J. Zenglein, Jacqueline Ives and Bjorn Conrad Made in China 2025: The 
Making of a High-Tech Superpower and the Consequences for Industrial Countries. Mercator Institute for China 
Studies, 2016), p. 7. 
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Conceptualizing the Link between Technology Competition and World 
Order Strategies 
Technology alone does not create strategic potential or defense capabilities. Organization 
of capabilities, and the coordination of efforts with allies and partners can contribute important 
leverage useful for shaping risk assumptions and managing escalation. 
Actors impacted by China’s strategy are tightly interconnected. Indeed, entities within 
China may gain or lose depending on the opposition that China’s policies provoke. This creates 
potential leverage that Western governments can use to complicate the implementation of China’s 
import substitution strategy. Selective engagement with Chinese firms that creates an interest in 
positive and mutually advantageous economic interaction is an element of any sensible counter 
strategy. Carrots and sticks have a place at this level – where individual transactions – both 
procurement or mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are being evaluated. 
The flip-side of a renewed emphasis on a rules-centric approach is red-lines that identify 
behavior and policies that run counter to a newly defined consensus on acceptable behavior. Like-
minded governments interested in the survival of an open global trading order will need to 
reconsider some long-settled rules and judgments to avoid a rapid erosion of support for a world 
trade regime widely perceived as ossified and unable to respond to the challenge posed by China. 
World order strategy requires the adoption by governments of closer collaboration with 
industrial and technology businesses based within their borders, but with global operations. 
Western countries that seek to maintain the competitiveness of their economies need to achieve 
consensus on new rules that preserve the viability of value creation in their own economies – and 
the accessibility of global supply chains that they require for profitability (and cost control). 
National targeting of these supply chains by China merits coordinated reprisals at the same scale 
as the aggressive – indeed predatory — campaigns that seek to undermine them – as is best 
exemplified by Made in China 2025. TPP countries, the EU, and other parties interested in open 
rules-based trade relations are the logical grouping for what amounts to a nascent countervailing 
coalition.  
9
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The Limits of Strategy: Less Theory and More Plans and Practice 
Strategy involves choice. Informed choices require systematic examination of decision 
dependencies in the short, medium and long term. Such a point of view is well known to military 
planners and grand strategists. We don’t need a new grand strategy, however. What we need is a 
memory and a plan for a near term path forward.  The historical legacy of US leadership during 
the Cold War and post-Cold War – while imperfect – allowed for global growth and prosperity 
almost unparalleled in the human experience. A memory for what prudential, consistent policies 
can deliver over decades long time horizons may help to reinforce cohesion among the like minded 
– especially in the face of short term reversals. That this prior period coincided with the emergence 
of the most destructive weapons ever created is an irony not lost on those with a long view of our 
limited powers of prediction.  
Nuclear deterrence provided stability at the global level, interrupting the cycles of Great 
Power warfare that characterize the international system. This did not end warfare (obviously) or 
organized violence. It did, however, facilitate the emergence an internationaL order that allowed 
for mutual gain – and reinforced rules set that justified limited aims and preserved the possibility 
of positive change without the resort to violence. The US-led Western community deserves some 
credit for this achievement and legacy. Its preservation requires a strategy that reconciles a new 
global capability distribution that empowers authoritarians, while at the same time reducing 
support in Western nations for the very achievement that led to unprecedented economic growth 
and wealth creation. 
Options  
Policy options for dealing with this emerging situation need to be flexible, multilateral, and 
to the greatest degree possible coordinated in terms of both timing and intensity of application. 
The environment for “easy alignment” among Western nations will be challenged by interest 
conflicts among historical allies – tied to desires for ongoing market access to China. Collective 
action by western states that allow the pursuit of objectives that preserve global supply chain 
flexibility and choice are most advisable as these minimize the effectiveness of likely “divide and 
conquer” countermeasures from China and its leading firms. Potential counters include: 
10
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- Coordinated Counter-Measures – responses designed to protect domestic consumers and 
industrial enterprises from the impact of anti-competitive effects of China’s policy 
approach 
- Tactical “mirror-imaging” of China’s Market Access Rules – A series of structured quid 
pro quo measures subjecting China-origin products and investments to reciprocal treatment 
depending on the openness of its markets to foreign competition and investment 
- Investment Surveillance and National Champions: Targeted Industrial Policy Interventions 
for designated strategic areas 
- Segmented Governance in the Information Sphere: Renewed attention to Internet 
governance and “public core” infrastructure issues 
- Selective “Militarization” of Cyberspace and Reciprocal Cyber Domain CBMs: Defense 
Investments as a Catalyst 
- Special rules for critical infrastructures – including collaborative active cyber defense for 
NATO and its partners 
Conclusions 
The Western democracies confront the rise of authoritarian countries with considerable 
economic potential. Worse still, the democracies are interdependent with China for complex global 
product chains and technology development systems that yield both new products, but also markets 
for digital services. This means that whatever challenges are presented, the relationship between 
the West and its new Asian competitors – principally China – will be both cooperative and 
competitive. This constrains the use of countermeasures and complicates strategic choice. 
Nonetheless, some actions can be taken to reduce the gains from theft of intellectual property, or 
the adoption of mercantilist economic policies that threaten to damage industrial competitiveness 
in North America and Europe.  
The list of six focus areas for policy identified above is not in priority order. A strategy 
needs to knit such activities together into coherent frameworks for defending access to technology 
markets and developmental processes for both products and platforms. For defense this means 
preserving industrial capabilities critical to weapon system and integrated platform development. 
For commercial activities this means preventing the leakage – or seeking to minimize the leakage 
and destruction – of core competencies held by named Western-based technology companies and 
their suppliers. 
11
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Some will dismiss the viability of this kind of approach, asserting that it amounts to 
“picking winners” in competitive markets — thereby negating the discipline of real competition. 
This is certainly a risk. Another risk is assuming that global technology markets can remain 
competitive when China adopts an aggressive technology acquisition strategy – alongside a 
mercantilist international trade approach that leverages IP theft and aggressive targeting of 
Western companies. Balancing these risks (among others) is the task of public and private sector 
stakeholders interested in reforming global economic governance to deal with the emerging 
challenge. 
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